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he notion of decarbonisation has changed over the years as a new consensus on long-
term climate objectives emerges.1 From being synonymous with emissions reduction in 
just some energy sectors, it has spread to all sections of the economy and society. 
Policymakers describe it as ushering in a new phase in industrialisation. aimed at underpinning 
the role of the EU in future technologies, fostering sustainable growth and jobs, and improving 
everyday life for EU citizens.  
Electrification continues to be identified as a least-cost decarbonisation option. In order to be 
successful, this will require competitive and affordable – for both industry and citizens – low-
carbon electricity at very large volumes. The EU can build upon the successes of its 2020 
strategy, but the cycle from 2020 to 2030 will bring new and bigger challenges. The volumes of 
renewable energy needed to meet the targets are of a different magnitude. The low-carbon 
transition will continue to spread further beyond the electricity sector into the mobility, energy-
intensive industry and gas sectors. By 2030, around 65-70% of electricity output – renewables 
and nuclear combined – will have zero marginal costs. This will transform the economics of the 
power sector.  
The recently approved electricity market design provides a robust and fit-for-purpose reform 
of the way new electricity markets work in the context of an ever-growing share of renewable 
generation. The market design did not modify the way wholesale electricity prices are 
1 A new consensus is forming based on the temperature targets of the Paris Agreement, the IPCC Special Report 
on the 1.5C target, and its implication that virtually all greenhouse gas emissions need to be eliminated eventually 
in so far as possible, and any residual emissions compensated with negative emissions; i.e. a net-zero GHG, or 
climate-neutral economy. 
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constituted in Europe. But, in a context of protracted overcapacity in generation, the further 
growth of renewable generation coupled with a stable contribution of nuclear in the day-ahead 
markets will further weaken the market price signal and with it, the ability to remunerate 
existing assets, let alone drive the investments required to meet EU climate ambitions. During 
its term, the new Commission will be increasingly faced with calls to provide effective signals 
to unlock investments, for example in the form of a newly conceived long-term price signal.  
A precondition for any signal to work will be a level playing field between the growing number 
of market participants, implying inter alia, carbon pricing, reforming grid tariffs, aligning 
competition policy with decarbonisation objectives and ensuring that wholesale prices are the 
main component of retail prices. In addition, fostering innovation offers the opportunity to 
make Europe a leader in some low-carbon key technologies and thus to generate a ‘transition 
dividend’ in terms of growth and jobs. Finally, the spread of – direct and indirect – electrification 
is likely to bring to the fore the question of who pays and for what and how. With electricity 
being a central vector to achieve EU energy and climate goals, it is counterintuitive to tax and 
levy electricity irrespective of its carbon content.  
Introduction  
A major achievement of the outgoing Juncker Commission was the gradual integration of 
climate, energy and economic competitiveness objectives into a coherent set of policies 
(Egenhofer and Elkerbout, 2019), which culminated with the November 2018 Long-term 
Strategy (European Commission, 2018) and its kick-starting of a debate on how to achieve EU 
long-term climate objectives, including how to achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050.2 A 
new and more ambitious target than the existing one of 80-95% greenhouse gas reductions by 
2050 compared to 1990 has become necessary in light of the 2015 Paris Agreement, reinforced 
by the IPCC (2018) Special Report on 1.5°C warming, and dramatically falling technology costs.3  
The Long-term Strategy identifies the energy and low-carbon economy transition as one of the 
vehicles to modernise the European economy; the competitiveness of European industry is 
underpinned by low-carbon energy and technology. Its corollary is that there will be no 
economy-wide decarbonisation if the EU power sector is not in a position to provide cost-
effective and affordable low-carbon electricity.4 The successive European Commission studies 
of energy prices and costs5 show that they are, and will remain, an important component of 
 
2 With a net-zero greenhouse gas emissions target, any remaining emissions should be balanced by negative 
emissions such as carbon removal, e.g. by growing carbon sinks such as forests which absorb carbon dioxide from 
the atmosphere. 
3 For an overview, see chapter 5 in CEPS (2018); batteries have dropped in price by 85% between 2010 and 2018, 
to on average 176 USD per kWh, e.g. BNEF (2019). Over the same period, cost reductions for renewables have 
likewise been significant for onshore wind (-49%), offshore wind (-56%), and solar PV (-84%); 
https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-powers-latest-plunge-costs-threatens-coal-gas/ 
4 This should not be confused with a more populist claim of ‘no cost’. 
5 European Commission (2019) for the latest edition. For all editions, see: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-
analysis/energy-prices-and-costs 
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industrial and economic competitiveness as well as of household purchasing power. With 
increasing electrification, electricity prices and costs will gradually take on the importance that 
global energy commodities (i.e. oil, gas, coal) have today.  
Electrification is a no-regret option  
Economic studies suggest that electrification is a no-regret option. Least-cost decarbonisation 
of the economy is best achieved initially by decarbonising the electricity sector (European 
Commission, 2018, p. 8), especially when compared to the higher costs associated with, for 
example, liquid fuels-based scenarios (e.g. IPCC, 2014, p. 418). Decarbonised electricity can be 
used to reduce emissions directly – through use of electricity in heating, transport or industry, 
sometimes referred to as sector coupling.6 Through technologies such as Power-to-X or green 
hydrogen more generally, electricity can be shifted to energy carriers for later consumption in 
other energy-consuming sectors.7  
Since 1990, CO2 emissions in the electricity sector have decreased by over 28%8 and there is a 
visible shared ambition among policymakers9 and the European electricity industry to 
accelerate decarbonisation. The current EU electrification rate is about 23%. The eight different 
scenarios developed in the European Commission’s Long-Term Strategy foresee the share of 
electrification in 2050 ranging from 41% to 53% (European Commission, 2018).  
It is easy to appreciate the size of the challenge faced by the EU electricity sector and the 
volumes that will be demanded in the future. However, an effective level of electrification will 
depend on numerous variables, each of them requiring specific policy attention: prices, long-
term price signals, convenience, infrastructure and technology,10 sharing of the cost associated 
with the transition, permitting procedures, and continued societal and political support. 
The next cycle will be different  
2030 is going to be very different from 2020. This is partly because the low-carbon transition 
will necessarily spread further beyond electricity generation and consumption, and partly 
because the volumes required for meeting the 2030 obligations are of a much greater 
magnitude.  
 
6 Sector coupling refers to the idea of interconnecting or integrating energy consuming sectors – buildings (e.g. 
heating and cooling), transport, and industry – with the power producing sector. 
7 See also: http://fsr.eui.eu/sector-coupling-and-sector-integration/ 
8 Own calculations using the EEA (2018) and Eurostat (2018).  
9 See e.g. the comments by Commissioner Arias Cañete at the release of the EC’s 2050 long-term climate strategy: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-6543_en.htm 
10 A major determinant of electrification will be investment and technological choices by energy-intensive 
industries in Europe. 
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Investment  
It is estimated that in 2030, some 75% of electricity output – renewables and nuclear combined 
– is going to have zero or very low marginal costs. At the same time, low-carbon electricity 
generation is very capital-intensive, meaning that the investors will have to put up more than 
90% of the total investment upfront, to be amortised over a long period. Electricity wholesale 
market prices to date and in the foreseeable future will not be enough, alone, to encourage 
sufficient investment. As time goes on, this dilemma will become more and more apparent.  
Flexibility  
In the second half of the 2020s, the flexibility needs of the EU electricity system are destined 
to escalate, as a result of the sheer volume of renewables as well as of decentralised generation 
sources. Fortunately, the digitalisation of electricity systems will provide new flexibility 
solutions. Similarly, gas can make a major contribution to addressing the flexibility challenge; 
initially through natural gas and, increasingly in the run-up to 2050, via low-carbon gas. The 
latter in return has implications for the power sector, e.g. demand for renewable energy but 
also the development of grids. 
Reinforcing the grid  
Investment in the grid and grid innovation are another no-regret policy. Incentives to perform 
necessary investments in hardware and services will have to come primarily from the regulators 
who face the challenge of ensuring that grid operators are rewarded, within their regulated 
revenues, for investing in a smarter grid, not just in larger ones.  
Beyond reinforcing the grids and technological upgrades for electricity infrastructures, 
legislators, and the EU in particular, will have to set new rules for flexibility products, taking into 
account that, for the foreseeable future, the most important scarcity in the market will be 
transmission and distribution capacity.  
Towards a post-2020 agenda  
The recently approved electricity market design provides a robust and fit-for-purpose reform 
of the way new electricity markets work in the context of an ever-growing share of renewable 
generation. However, the market design reform has not, and was never meant to review the 
way wholesale electricity is priced in Europe. It is reasonable to expect that the further 
penetration of variable renewable generation in the electricity mix, coupled with a stable 
contribution of nuclear, by shifting the cost structure of the offer towards fixed costs, will 
increase the volatility of wholesale electricity prices and hence the risks for investors. There is 
a risk that in the period up to 2030, the wholesale (day-ahead) market price will be further 
weakened and thereby the ability to remunerate existing assets, let alone drive the investments 
required to meet EU climate ambitions. Three issues stand out: price signals, cost allocation 
and innovation. 
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a) Long-term price signal plus  
Current price signals are not in line with investment needs and the rate of investment required. 
Various factors have contributed to this situation. Among them are the economic cycle, 
deindustrialisation and energy efficiency in industry, international gas prices and overcapacity 
in generation. The overcapacity problem stems from the fact that the renewable capacities 
brought into the system as a result of EU and national policies should have been offset by 
equivalent closures of existing inflexible capacities. This was necessary, and partly still is, 
because electricity demand has been stagnating if not contracting for the whole 2012-2020 
period. Unfortunately, the size and speed of these closures has been largely insufficient to 
address the oversupply. Neither could the EU ETS, although the most recent reforms should be 
able to tackle the consequences of oversupply to a certain degree through mechanisms limiting 
the supply of allowances.  
The structural shift towards renewables will continue to exert downward pressure on 
wholesale electricity prices across the EU. This means that the recent and foreseeable price 
paths of electricity wholesale prices will most likely be unable to generate a sufficiently robust 
and stable investment signal to encourage new investments or even to remunerate existing 
assets. It is already now foreseeable that the gap between the full costs and market value of 
generation and wholesale prices will need to be bridged. This is true for both renewable and 
conventional generation.  
While long-term power purchasing agreements (PPAs) will play an important role in this 
context,11 and can still be expanded, it is hard to see how they could, alone, solve the impending 
imbalance. Pricing of long-term power purchasing agreements are generally based on the 
wholesale market price, which reflects the general electricity wholesale price performance. 
However, bilateral contracts risk not reflecting the costs of security of supply in the power price. 
The new Commission should not underestimate the risk that the generation sector, irrespective 
of the technology entailed, could stumble into becoming an ever more regulated business 
where member states and in some case local governments design ‘tailor-made’ national or 
regional solutions instead of a ‘market’ perspective.  
As stated by the 2018 European Commission (2019) report on energy prices and costs, a 
decoupling effect between investments and price signals can be observed. This should suggest 
the opportunity of rethinking electricity pricing to establish a new methodology with a holistic 
approach, by taking into account energy, capacity, flexibility and system needs. Revenues from 
these markets should be able to cover both capital and operating costs, as the central focus. 
The market may need a long-term price signal to plan adequate returns on future assets and 
stabilise financial planning but also to reduce the cost of capital by reducing the risk premium. 
We have called this the long-term price signal plus.  
 
11 COWI & CEPS (forthcoming). 
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b) Distributional issues, costs and allocation of costs  
There is a general consensus about the fact that reaching 2030 targets will imply extending 
emissions reductions efforts further beyond the electricity sector by shifting attention to 
transport, heating and cooling and, possibly, other everyday aspects of life for EU citizens. In 
order to make sure that specific climate and energy policies will enjoy the support of voters, an 
effective approach is needed at both EU and member state levels for dealing with distributional 
aspects, i.e. who bears the cost.12 
A first element of cost-efficient electricity decarbonisation is reliance on markets in the power 
sector. This will require reinstating a ‘meaningful’ price dynamic in the day-ahead market. 
Another element is carbon pricing, as in the EU Emissions Trading System, which is still the most 
efficient implementation of the polluter pays principle. Cost-effectiveness can be increased if 
carbon content is also taxed in sectors outside those already covered by the EU ETS, particularly 
for heating and transport, as far as politically feasible. Acceptable and correct market signals 
will be essential for triggering a change in customer and investor behaviour. A difficult issue to 
tackle will be the indicated carbon cost and its associated compensation as laid down in Art. 
10a(6) of the EU ETS Directive. 
Also, the whole debate on transition cannot exclusively focus on its associated costs. 
Decentralised and digitalised electricity systems generate revenues that can also benefit 
consumers. The recently approved reform of the market design enables all consumers to 
generate, store and/or sell their own electricity to the market based on retail market 
conditions. Demand response means allowing consumers to, for example, adapt their energy 
usage to different energy prices throughout the day to receive a payment from an energy 
service company. These are concrete benefits, in terms of new sources of disposable income 
or reduced energy bills, that have the potential of contributing to establish a more balanced 
and fairer energy transition.  
To achieve this will require major efforts, for example by reforming energy and electricity 
taxation including charges. If electricity is a major driver in achieving EU energy, climate and 
environmental goals, it makes little sense to tax electricity irrespective of its carbon content. 
According to the European Commission (2019) study on energy prices and costs, taxes and 
levies still represent more than 40% of final electricity prices. Another key element is the 
removal of non-electricity components such as levies and charges from the retail price. The 
proceeds raised from carbon pricing, for example through higher ETS prices, an ETS expansion 
or carbon taxes in the non-ETS sector could then be used to compensate for the loss of 
revenues from electricity taxes and levies. This would likely increase political acceptability.  
We should also expect that, in addition, policy at EU or member state level will need to 
effectively address energy poverty, where it exists, preferably through transfers or social policy. 
If such efforts fail, either investment will stall, or political support erode, or both. ‘Rationalising’ 
 
12 See for example Zachmann (2018) on the distributional impacts of climate change policy. 
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the allocation of costs will also require an adaptation of grid fees and grid regulation as 
described in the previous chapter.  
c) Innovation  
Decarbonisation technologies are an area where EU industry generally has competitive 
advantages. It is therefore also a field where Europe could reaffirm its role as a global legislative, 
regulatory, technology and industrial power. In parallel, ‘low-carbon industry’ offers the 
prospect for new value-added solutions and more generally, opportunities for applications of 
technological innovation and the creation of new business models.  
However, solutions are only now being developed, and it is probably too early to know what 
the future electricity system will look like. Innovation, e.g. in technology, new services and new 
business models, will need to be able to occur freely in order to foster the development of new 
value chains across the board, e.g. electricity supply and demand, mobility, information 
technology and data, etc. 
Therefore, an essential element for the EU will be the development of a framework to provide 
a level playing field, for example for supply, demand and grids, to ensure cost-effective 
solutions. In addition, to the level playing field, there will be a need for research and innovation 
in new, and some not yet foreseen, technologies that will accelerate the transformation of the 
electricity sector. 
Looking ahead and the role of electricity 
Under the last Commission, the decarbonisation paradigm both widened and deepened with 
practical implications for the industry, legislators and regulators alongside a greater salience of 
the issue among voters. As repeatedly stated, 2030 will be a different story from the already 
challenging 2020 strategy. The volumes needing to be mobilised will lead to some concrete 
consequences, in the first place for policymakers. The new Commission will need to develop a 
more comprehensive framework. Some – still controversial – proposals have been flagged 
recently. President Macron proposed the constitution of a European Climate Bank in the 
broader context of issuing green bonds for infrastructures.13 More recently, European 
Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen gave traction to the French proposal by 
endorsing the creation of a bank to concentrate on climate change and aimed at scaling up 
green investment across the continent. Von der Leyen signalled that modifying the mandate of 
the European Investment Bank is among the options under consideration. 
Although the concepts differ in many aspects, these and other similar recently elaborated 
proposals converge on the idea that the energy transition has the potential to breathe new life 
and perceived purpose into the European project. They also agree upon the opportunity of 
using the decarbonisation strategy as an addition to already existing tools to fix more structural 
 
13 https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/03/04/for-european-renewal.en 
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imbalances in the present macroeconomic and financial structures of the EU, namely by helping 
the emergence of a EU safe asset class in the form of green bonds or equivalent investment 
vehicles to support the EU 2030 targets. In the present context of a sharp contraction in 
renewables investment (IEA, 2018), such a perspective gains even more importance.  
Moreover, in financial and environmental policies, the relevant regulatory framework would 
benefit from better coordination across government agencies and departments to ensure that 
financing reaches the intended goals. This is essentially the purpose of the sustainable finance 
approach at EU level, a goal that will reinforce the already growing role of active private 
investors in reshaping the direction and logic of private investors in asset allocation.  
Recognition of change is visible for example in the attention increasingly given to the cost of 
capital, essential not only for the competitiveness of low-carbon technologies including 
electricity, but also the future macro-economic effects of electrification (FTI Consulting & 
Compass Lexecon, 2018). This extends in addition to the role of monetary policy and large 
institutional financial investors in keeping decarbonisation cost at its lower economic boundary. 
In 2018, Benoît Cœuré,14 Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, argued that a lasting shift 
in the energy mix can be expected to introduce a persistent change in relative prices; inflation, 
costs of capital and energy investments mutually influence each other. Increasingly, macro-
economists are starting to discover the possible implications of the low-carbon transition. And 
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